

Duško Petrović

Zagreb

duspetrov@yahoo.com

UDK 172.15:111.821

323.14:111.821

Review

Received: July 14, 2006

Accepted: August 10, 2006.

Anatomy of Identity

Theoretical Approach to Identity

This research will deal with the theoretical definitions of collective identity and factors which influence its formation.

We will rely on, now already 'classic' literature in this field, written by Western European and American authors. Under 'classics' in this field, I primarily refer to the works of B. Anderson, F. Barth, A.D. Smith and E. Gellner.

According to my opinion, each of these four authors has greatly contributed to the research of collective identity with their theoretical concepts. My intention here is to come up with one integral theory which would unite the key concepts of their theoretical approaches.

Maybe this selection of authors is a bit narrow for my attempt. This may present a problem in case that this 'narrowness' results in an omission of an important theoretical conclusion.

I will try to avoid his 'danger' by consulting new sociological theories which studies the phenomena of nations and nationalisms. As a guide I will use a book by V. Katunarić, 'Sporna zajednica', which provides an outline of the new theories in the fields of study of nations and nationalisms. I will employ a problem-solving approach and refer to the recent historical events. Because of this, my intermissions in the theoretical analyses will be short paragraphs in the form of essays. My concern with recent historical events will lead us to the current questions of the ways in which processes of globalization can influence the formation of collective identities. The aim of this article is not to give a detailed outline of these processes, but to present a wider theoretical perspective in the study of collective identities.

Key words: collective identity, nation, nationalism, state

Introduction

Modern theoretical approaches to identity emphasize the fact that identity is a dynamic phenomenon which is built through processes. In this context, the terms which are used are the building of identity, designing or constructing of identity. These approaches presuppose that there is a plan or a project for creation of identity, which had to be realized. These projects are designed and implemented by specific groups or individuals. In scientific literature these groups are called the *elites*. *Elites* can be political, cultural and economic. In cultural elite we can also include scientists who can, through their scientific work, influence the construction of identity. We will return to this fact a bit later.

In this article I will show that this is just one of the aspects which determines the formation of identity.

At the beginning of this discussion I will try to prove that collective identity is in fact a *process*. The processes in which identities are formed are largely determined by human activities and inter-relatedness on group and individual levels.

In the first chapter we will point to the types of inter-relatedness revealing that the consciousness about unity and difference happens on the level of culture. Even though identity is the consequence of the joint activities on several levels, the processes of identification are happening on the cultural level. Different cultural elements (language, tradition, religion, belief in a common origin) serve as a material for these processes.

Even though ethnology, according to its definition deals mostly with *ethnoses*, their culture, origin, i.e. with ethnic identities, I will place special attention to the concepts of nation and national identity.¹

Cultural-historical approach in ethnology has been frequently criticized because of its neglect of a political dimension. *Political unconsciousness* of ethnology 'smelt' of ideology. The aim of debating about national identity is to use the analysis of nation to pass from the sphere of culture to the sphere of politics, state and power. We will see that for the construction of national identity (or any other) what matters is the power and power relations. We will deal here with the supranational character of power

¹ In his article entitled 'Understanding of the work on the Ethnological Atlas of Europe and Neighboring Countries', Bratanić has outlined his definition of ethnology: 'Ethnology is a science of culture and human groups as carriers of culture'. Human groups which are being studied are the ethnoses: 'After Bromley, the main subject of ethnology are the ethnoses, peoples.' 'The term *ethnos* was used for the first time by Širokogorov, who defined it (1923) as a group of people who speak the same language, recognize the common origin, share a complex of customs and way of life, which are preserved and transmitted through tradition, and which differentiates them from other similar groups (Bromley 1973). 'Ethnoses are not based on the people's free will: 'These units are created not through people's will, but as a result of the historical process.' 'As a characteristic of the *ethnos*, an important role has the reciprocal differentiation of the antithesis 'us'-'them', a characteristic trace of *ethnos* is also its relative stability.'

and with the states for which we will claim that they are the most stable reservoirs of power in the modern world.

This discussion will lead us to the categorizations of society and supranational systems of power and inequalities.

Our journey to the global world will end up with an integral theory which refers to the factors which influence the building of collective identity.

Identity

What are we actually talking about when we are talking about identity?

We can start our discussion by taking a short detour to the history of Western philosophy which considered identity as its central ontological category. Here we will not deal with specific philosophers, but we will try to emphasize certain significant characteristics of the concept of *identity*.

Why do I start with the philosophical concept of identity? Because I think that the tradition of Western philosophical thought has greatly influenced the conceptual framework which we today use in scientific discourse but also in our everyday life. I also think that the short overview of the historical development of the concept of *identity* will help us in detailed theoretical analysis of this 'fleeting' concept called *identity*. In other words, I think that the history of philosophy will be best to show us exactly what the concept of identity *is not*.

The word identity comes from Latin *identitas*, the stem of which *idem* means 'the same'. *Identitas* could be translated as being the same, being identical. Therefore, a word identity denotes a relationship in which a being, a concept or a characteristic is identical to itself. In that sense, the verb 'to identify' means 'to make the same'.

The concept of identity stemmed from logic and philosophy and primarily it denoted the sameness of objects and beings in the context of global change. Accordingly, identity denotes the most important elements of an object or a being, that is, that lasting element which makes stone a stone.

Therefore, the concept of identity has, in logic and philosophy, covered, speaking in the language of popular philosophy, the 'wholeness of a being' and was a medium through which beings were beings. Therefore in the context of the philosophical tradition which we inherited primarily from the ancient Greeks, identity was a central ontological category.

However, what does this finding mean for us today? Do we understand identity today in the above mentioned context? To answer these questions we would again have to resort to philosophical tradition, more specifically to Aristotle, and his division on natural and artificial beings. Natural beings are 'self-grown', 'inborn', Aristotle would

say: who move by themselves. Natural beings exist independently of man's activities and findings. Among natural beings we can include all natural things and objects (except for animals). Those beings which man put into motion through his activities and, thus, created them, are the so-called cultural beings. This division is artificial and serves only for better understanding since man also, a creator of culture, is a natural being determined by its species.

But what about the modern understanding of identity in the framework of the previous discussion? When in everyday speech we use the concept of identity to describe an individual or a person, are we describing this individual as a natural being determined by his species or are we referring to this specific individual as governed by his own will and consciousness, determined by actions and ideas? Is collective identity (for example, a nation), which consists of a number of individuals, a self-grown, natural object, which exists on itself and changes independently? Is nation a natural concept independent of human activities and findings? Or simply, does identity belong to the group of natural beings, objects which exist independently on human will and actions?

If we agree with the claim that with modern usage of the concept of identity we always refer to a unique human individual who is not identical with any other individual, in other words, with an individual with his/her own will and consciousness, than we can safely conclude that a groups of such individuals who form a collective identity is not a natural object which is independent of human will, actions and findings. This differentiation is very important because it places the question of collective identity directly into the realm of society, culture and politics. It is clear from this that the theory which puts nation in the group of natural objects with biological characteristics (scientific claims which see nation through the concepts of ethno-genesis and kinship relations between peoples are well known), becomes an important political question. In the analytic-theoretical sense with these attitudes we can observe a strict division between the subject and object of analysis, where nation is objectified, i.e. seen as a natural object.²

This attitude clouds the fact that the identity is a product of activities and neglects the above mentioned fundamental truth that in the social sphere, to which we have restricted the concept of identity, we are dealing with subjects, to which we have moral responsibility as well.

That, of course does not mean that we can neglect the concept of object in the analytic-theoretical sense, nor the process of objectification in the ontological sense. In the construction of identity, actually, there is a constant logical antinomy in which

² In the same article Bratanić spoke about ethnological analytic-theoretical concept: 'Every empirical science (including ethnology) has to have its object which exists independently of man's will. Each real object has many aspects. On the other hand, the objective aspect is that aspect of a general object which was selected by scientists for scientific research.' 'The subject of ethnology are the peoples, ethnos, and the object is traditional, everyday, culture.'

subjects and objects, depending on the standpoint, constantly change their positions. The important characteristic of this occurring is the process in which, on the field of human interaction (individual-individual, group-group, group-individual), subjects become objects and objects become subjects.

In the analytic-theoretical approach to the research of identity (and in other types of research), the researcher-scientist meets with the famous paradox of a liar. The object which is observed is simultaneously the subject the researcher interacts with. The researcher who is the subject of the analysis is also the object acted upon. In this game of acting and interacting, cognition and self-cognizance are produced, or, in other words, *knowledge* which is the product of human historical praxis. For example: during the process of self-cognizance (which can be divided on introspection and on symbolic placing of oneself in one's own surroundings), the subject continually passes through the process of objectification (in the process of introspection he/she objectifies emotions and physical aspect while in the process of symbolic placing he/she searches for an 'objective', social confirmation of one's own value), and transmission of his/her own subjectivity into objectivity. Objectivity, on the other hand, constitutes and confirms subjectivity. This process of constitution could 'get stuck' on any of the two opposing sides. As I have already mentioned, the one-sided objectification of nation can result in the neglect of the fact that nations are composed of subjects. The consequences are well known: thousands of 'subjects' sacrificed for the survival of the nation.

On the other hand, subjectivity can lack objectification. In or example of the process of self-cognizance this can result in the 'termination of introspection'. i.e. abolition of physical aspect, death or maybe the absence of social confirmation which can result, in psychological sphere, with the lack of self-respect.

To conclude, identity is, above all, a product of human action and interaction, cognition and self-cognizance, or, simply, of human historical praxis. Its important characteristic is its processing aspect, in other words, it is always constructed and constituted in a process. The ways of constituting of identity depend on the types of human interaction and processes. For the constitution of identity the following spheres of human relation are important:

1. Sphere of intimate relations which belongs to the private sphere. The dominant social unit in this relationship sphere is family. Family ensures offspring, therefore, the material existence of a human individual, a subject. Family is the first and the most important step in the process of the building of the individual identity of every person, because the first socialization of an individual into the group and the society happens through family. A significant level of emotional bonding is present within a family which ensures a high level of solidarity. The family is also an important step for a person's normal psychological and physical development. In the sphere of intimate relations we can also include a person's attitude towards himself/herself, his/her individuality, i.e. his/her personal identity, personal history. Even though the sphere of intimacy and personal identity should, according to the

definition, belong to the private sphere, in the late modernity and post-modernity increased intimation of the public and global space can be observed. From the variety of personal identities, I will single out gender, professional and religious identity. Maybe it seems unjustified to include these identities into the sphere of intimate relations, however, we do this because we observe it in the frameworks of modernity and social situation characteristic for modernity in which these identities have all receded into the private sphere. This conclusion seems especially 'wobbly' on the questions of gender and religious identity which in modernity are burdened with political connotations. We are the witnesses of the political struggle for gender rights and flourishing of political-religious fundamentalism of various kinds. Maybe it would be more appropriate to agree with the conclusion that all the three above mentioned types of identity, depending on the social situation, have a tendency of transferring from the private to the public sphere and vice versa.

2. Sphere of economic relations and economic exchange. Economic sphere touches on both public and private sphere, in other words, in capitalism primarily private interests and needs are economically satisfied, whereas the public sphere is the market which mediates and ensures that the private interests and needs are satisfied. Therefore, the public aspect of the economic sphere is constituted by the market which today largely surpasses national borders. This is a very important fact which we have to take into account with the analysis of global movements and globalization. However, the economic sphere does not satisfy only strictly material interests and needs. Economic sphere can also satisfy the need for identification and belonging to a group, class, community. Transmission of economic relations to the social sphere, according to the established theories, creates *classes and class identity*. We are not buying only 'material needs', but also identity. It is interesting to point to the fact that according to the Marxist theory class identity should have been the revolutionary integrative movement on a global level. The course of history refuted this claim and turned the scale in favor of national identity. Revolutions were lead inside specific nations. For economics sphere it is important to point out that it depends on the distribution and organization of work, technological development of the productive forces, relations of ownership, distribution and amount of capital, financial and monetary transactions, etc. These indicators determine the type of economic system. One of these systems is the global capitalism. Economic sphere ensures the material basis for the survival of individuals, groups, communities and states.
3. Sphere of political relations. It should deal exclusively with the public activities. Therefore, political relations are primarily linked to the activities in a community and for the community on the basis of general interest. Political activity establishes institutions or is realized through institutions which regulate life in a community and ensure its continuity and survival. Good political action, through its care for a community, takes care of the individual as well. It takes care of his/her protection, protection of his/her ownership, life, rights, or, in other words, for his/her

harmonious development and prosperity. Through political institution flows the power which enables the application of different forms of authorities and governments as specific forms of political action. For our analysis it is important to emphasize that the power in the political sphere stems from the consensus of the members of a community about the specific forms of the application of power and authority. As Hannah Arendt (1970) showed when analyzing revolutionary overthrows, the obedience of the citizens to a government, laws, institutions or rulers depends mostly on the public opinion through which the positive support and general acceptance of this form of government is manifested. This is an important fact which explains why something apparently as banal as *imagined community* (in the interpretation of B. Anderson this is the paraphrase of nation) has such a political power. But that also explains why nation-state can get corrupted. The change of content and scope of public opinion (characteristic for the process of globalization), can destabilize the already constructed communities showing us the frequently neglected power of symbols, principles and beliefs. Power and authority produce physical force through which they ensure coercion to order, on the internal plan and the army force on the outer plan. Army force can cause physical destruction of individuals and communities. It ensures means of coercion, submission and deprivation of liberty. It is the source of constant danger which incites fear and distrust which in turn are the source of the constant tension between political subjects. Perception of danger and risk can have a key role in the constitution of the political community. Political subjects are free for the outer world, when they possess political independence, in other words, the possibility of making independent political decisions and when they are, as such, recognized by other political subjects. The dominant form of political organization in today's world is the modern state, or, we can add, nation-state.

4. Sphere of culture. Simply put, the sphere of culture can be called the empire of signs. The empire of signs is governed by a system of signs which we call language. Signs, as we know, are the mediators in all the human relations. Through signs we become aware of the relationships and processes, through them we direct and coordinate (political and economic) actions, create spaces of similarities and differences, through signs we communicate our feelings, knowledge and experience in the spatial and temporal modes, codify social and legal norms, by signs we write down events and create memories and history, opinions and creeds, or simply, through signs we articulate reality.

The sphere of culture contains language, social norms and customs, opinions and knowledge, religion, mythology, common memories and history. It is important to emphasize that in the cultural sphere the perception, articulation and understanding of **sameness and varieties** i.e. **identity** and difference are dominant. (In the political sphere the dominant element is the **recognition of sameness** and differences, i.e. the recognition of identity).

*Through **acting** in spheres which we have emphasized so far (**intimate, political, economic, cultural**), gathering experience, knowledge, exchanging information, individuals and groups*

*realize **understanding and articulation of similarities and differences**. Through activities they **build and understand** personal and collective **identity** simultaneously, through **shaping and domesticating** reality on personal and group level. However, the process is reversible, through understanding and articulation they simultaneously act by building their personal and collective identities.*

Cultural sphere through the articulation of identity dominantly ascribes meaning to human actions.

Important characteristic of the processing aspect in the four above-mentioned spheres is their interaction, interconnectedness and interdependence in the building of identity. Which of the spheres will be dominant in the building of identity will mostly depend on the historical situation in a given period and type of identity which is studied. Under historical situation we primarily mean the *power relations* which exist in specific time and in a specific region. The power relations determine which sphere will be dominant in the building of identity. For the analysis of the dynamics of the spheres, we can use the Castells's division on the types of identity which is outlined in the reference in the pages 9 and 10. It will serve as a theoretical framework for the discovery of the identity dynamics in global processes. I will discuss this later.

In this research, I have decided to pay more attention to the most successful and most powerful collective identity of the modern era, and that is national identity. When I say that national identity is the most powerful and the most successful, I refer to that fact that out of all these identities which we have mentioned briefly, national identity has today the greatest influence on people's lives on a global level. In recent times, the only identity which can compete with it is the religious identity, in the form of pan-Islamism. The answer to the question why is national identity the most successful and the most powerful identity falls outside the frameworks of this article. I will enumerate only a few points I will analyze later in more details.

One of the possible answers to this question is the claim that a nation systematically fits into the supranational power system of liberalism which has a leading position on global level. Under leading position I refer to the fact that liberalism (aka liberal capitalism) as a system in global power relations managed to gather the greatest amount of power, in majority of cases on the expense of the others. Under power, I mean material, physical and cultural power. As its centers of power liberalism has produced liberal nation-states. I will not try to analyze to which extent nation fitted into communist supranational system, but it is evident today that the majority of the communist countries which persisted till the present day, had a national character.

To the pan-Islamic project of the union of all the Muslim countries on the religious bases, national separateness is unfavorable. However, the question is to what extent is the pan-Islamism a constructive system, and to what extent it is only an identity of resistance in the processes of globalization, which will be discussed later.

The greatest amount of power which was produced by the liberal system was not the only systematic reason for the success of this system. According to my opinion, the

second reason is stability. In one point in time, liberal system, through drawing maximal benefit for the system itself, also drew maximal benefit for its parts, nation-states (of course, not all nation-states, but only the developed, Western, ones). Under the framework of the harmonized operation of the system, the liberal nation-state had the possibility to perform its function to the optimal level – to satisfy the needs of the majority of its members in all the four spheres of the relationships. This means, in other words, and from the standpoint of the states seen as a unique system, to pay equal attention to all the mentioned spheres. This creates a harmony of spheres, with equal attention paid to all the spheres. Through such attempts, the state managed to create stability. There are two reasons which transformed the liberal nation-state into the most successful form of merging in the modern age:

1. the greatest amount of power which the system, hence, the state, had in relation to its competitors
2. stability in relation to its competitors

All other forms of merging (in modernity there were several: communist state, religious state, national-social state) tried to emphasize one sphere of relations over other spheres. In the end, such communities showed either remarkable instability or lack of competitiveness in relation to the liberal state. They aimed or are aiming at submissiveness, dependence and division. This harmonious development of liberal state is, primarily, typical for the mature modernism, crowned by the Western liberal state of wealth. Many authors emphasize that the harmonious development of all the spheres of liberal state is disturbed by the further development of the supranational systems of power which, in the framework of their paradigm, continued to develop economic relations. This disturbed functioning of states in four spheres.

More detailed analysis of these processes will be done in the next chapter, where I will speak more on state, nation, supranational system of power and inequality.

Supranational system of power, society, state, nation

In the previous chapter we have, through abstract theoretical concepts, smuggled the term such as liberalism, nation, state, nation-state. For the purpose of more detailed analysis we will emphasize the respective categories of these concepts by putting them into relations of their interdependence. First I will introduce the category of the major (general) system of power which has a supranational character. Today the most dominant major system I can outline is, the already mentioned, liberal capitalism, which has a primacy on global level. On global plan liberalism is confronted with, or was confronted with, communism (bolshevism) and today with religious fundamentalism in the form of pan-Islamism (Katunarić 2003).

Whether another global system will appear on the global scene is an interesting question. But this is not the topic of this research. For the purpose of more detailed

analysis and throwing more light on these issues and following Katunarić I will here introduce the concept of society. Society is a general concept which refers to all the forms of communal life of people (Katunarić 2003:50). Society has two dimensions (Katunarić 2003:53). Society can be defined as a set of horizontal and vertical links between individuals and groups which reproduce or upgrade the existing forms of inequality and power, including group boundaries. However, it is important to point out that society is also a set of links and activities which can abolish this order. This is what happened in specific periods of modern history. The task of the social scientists should be the affirmation of other dimensions of society and the critical evaluation of the existing situation (Katunarić 2003:53). The reason for the rejection of the existing situation is the nature of liberal system. Liberal system of power projects society as a *final reality* which is composed of two spheres: global flow of things and nationally determined community of people (Katunarić 2003:53). The global system of power enables and entices the global flow of things which is embedded in the free trade, while the flow of people is strictly controlled. By controlling the flow of people the general system of power creates separate communities between people between whom there is an unequal distribution of wealth and power. According to this, a nation therefore represents an instance of a more general concept of society as a system of power and inequality.

According to Katunarić, an author who made a theoretical breakthrough in terms of linking society as a system of power and nation as a system of collective identity is Michael Mann (Katunarić 2003:253). According to Mann, the society is based on the four pillars of power: economic, military, political and cultural. These pillars are crystallized in states.

The basic concept which is now introduced to the analysis is the concept of power. The basic reservoir of power in the modern world is the state. In contemporary world, not a single community can survive without the cooperation and with the participation of the state. The concept of nation is derived from the concept of the modern state. The so-called national question then comes down to the question of gathering power which will then produce either an independent state or special privileges for an ethnic community inside an existing state.

If we perceive global society as an abstract scheme, in other words, as a system of power and inequalities, nation-state emerges as the most persistent and the most effective reservoir of power. Namely, nation-state is the center of the organized physical force, it possesses, besides material goods, ideological capability, which is not less important and which creates a sort of stronger or weaker loyalty to the state system which is then, in a short period of time, capable of mobilizing large amounts of manpower for military and other purposes. Besides physical force, state possesses legal and political framework which ensures to its members the legal, social protection and education. To the capital, it ensures safe asylum, educated and local manpower, legal and judicial framework for its undisturbed circulation and turnover. State in macroeconomic sphere encourages investments, develops financial market, ensures steady development and full employment, and incites export (Keynes's regulation).

It supports interests of its companies abroad. And what is today especially important, the state ensures the undisturbed activities of scientific institutions, preserves and uses knowledge, enables communications.

Under the framework of the global liberal system each state as the most efficient reservoir of power, tries to increase this power, maximize the benefits and wealth for itself and its members or specific groups of members (here I primarily refer to the groups of powerful individuals who make up the elite of a certain state).

My thesis is the following: In global power relations, the state is still the key power holder, the key factor which determines economic, population and other movements, and as the dominant social entity it still, to the greatest extent, determines the global state of affairs. Nation and nationalism determined by nation-state with its, in many aspects particularistic politics, is not always just a passive observer which feels awkward in the globalization processes, there are nation states which, through their particularistic activities, encourage and stabilize globalization processes and participate in them as important contributing factors. This thesis, presented here through the works of Michael Mann, has been often rejected. Many authors, while emphasizing globalization relations are trying to prove that state, the firmest reservoir of power in the globalization processes, losses its influence and independence. Authors like Emanuel Castells (Castells 2002) claim that in the *information age*, the state slowly, but definitely losses the battle with the *network society*, which emerges as the dominant form of merging in the postmodern world. In other words, in the global world which is increasingly interconnected, the state losses its independence and sovereignty. In globalization, *civil societies* (products of the work of the state, or of, as Castells calls them, *legitimizing*, institutions) are diminishing and dividing. The reason is the *non-existence of the continuity of the logic of creation of power in the global network and logic of merging and representation in specific societies and cultures* (Castells 2002:21).

Indeed, in today's neo-liberal world we can observe a significant decline of the state functions. Here I primarily refer to the abolishing of social contracts between the capital, labor force and state which leads to the decline of the social component of the state apparatus which, as a consequence, has the loss of legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. Due to the instability and non-transparency of the global processes, the marked profiteering on the side of the companies and unstable labor market there is a growing mistrust towards the companies and, indirectly, towards the state which promotes globalization processes. According to Castells, we are witnessing process of separation of power holders, state apparatus which supports global holders of power, from the citizens who, with their right to vote, form the basis and foundation of the political system. The consequence is the appearance of the *identity of resistance* as the dominant form of identity in the modern globalized society.³

³ Castells (2002): 'Since social building of identity always happens in the context which is determined by relations of power, I suggest three forms and origins of the building of identity:

1. *Legitimizing identity* which is introduced by the dominant social institutions so that they could expand and rationalize their dominance in relations to the social subjects, a topic which constitutes the main part Sennet's theory of authority and domination, but also covers different theories on nationalism.

The identity of resistance is not constructive in its nature, but through its logic it is trying to disassociate itself from the global processes by judging people more through *what they are then through what they are doing*. Among such forms of identity we can include *communalism*, *religious fundamentalism* and *nationalism* (Castells 2002).

This form of nationalism specifically affects, on global level, marginal nation-states where the loss of independence and sovereignty, i.e. the loss of material basis on which the state is built, is significant. However, exactly the loss of material basis is the principle from which nationalism gets its strength in the global capitalist society. In the developed countries, the so-called winners in the global world, (because of the above mentioned processes) we can also observe the growing distrust towards the state, i.e. the identity the state is trying to build (*legitimizing identity*), the fragmentation of identity, communalization and even religious fundamentalism specifically present with the sects of different religious traditions, etc. There are many indicators which show that Castells's insistence on the identity of resistance as the dominant form of identity in today's world is largely justified, especially if we take into account the marginal, 'loser,' states such as Croatia with its 'Balkan surroundings'. However, regarding the question of the power of the state in the global world, Castells himself admitted that the state, as a historical praxis will not, at least not any time soon, become extinct. He agrees with Martin Carnoy (Castells 2002:331) who claims that the competition between nations is still the function of national politics of each country, and economic attractiveness of a specific country to foreign multinational companies is a function of local economic, and we might add, legal conditions. Carnoy thinks that multinational companies to a large extent depend on their domicile states which provide them with direct or indirect protection, and that national politics of human capital have key influence to the productivity of the economic subjects inside national territory. Thompson (Castells 2002:312) adds to the relationship between corporations and state, the existence of a multitude of different ways in which the governing power of the nation-state facilitates or hinders the movement of capital, labor, information and goods.

Even though global connectedness and interconnectedness is now increasing, which leads to the formation of supranational bodies of control such as MMF, WTO, EU

2. *Identity of resistance* which is created by those subjects which are in the positions/conditions where they are marginalized and/or stigmatized through the logic of domination, and hence dig trenches for resistance and survival based on the principles which are different or opposite to the ones permeating state institutions, as Calhoun suggested in his explanation of the emergence of the politics of identity.

3. *Project identity* is created when social subjects, on the basis of any cultural material which is available to them, build new identity which re-defines their position in a society and, by doing that, they are attempting at the transformation of the whole social structure. This is, for example, the case when feminism leaves the trenches of the identity of resistance and women rights to challenge patriarchy, together with patriarchic family and the whole structure of production, reproduction, sexuality and individuality on which the societies were historically based.'

'Legitimizing identity creates civil society...'

'Identity for resistance...brings to the formation of communes or communities', '... project identity, creates subjects...'

and the others, it is difficult to imagine that these can survive if, in their activities, they will not follow the interests of particular, the most powerful members, and will not encourage their further power-growth. Castells claims that these supranational organizations were actually formed so as to strengthen the existing member countries, but, because of the inability of member countries to achieve certain agreements, international organizations are entering into independent projects and hence obtain the increasing level of independence. However, as a counter-argument to his claim, we can emphasize that supranational organizations which do not represent the interests of their most powerful members have hard time surviving on the world scene and in principle do not come up with some binding decisions. As an example we should analyze what is happening today with the UN, ecological summits and maybe even EU. In all these organizations, when the interests of the leading members are not taken into account, we witness serious crises in their work. Of course, such discussions fall out of the framework of this article. However, the thesis on the loss of power of the state in the globalized world has, in the research of nations and nationalisms, a theoretically significant consequence. Since state loses its power, nationalism as the product of state apparatus, becomes irrelevant. Even though this consequence can not be directly drawn from Castells's work, it is important not to neglect that aspect in research of nations and nationalisms. Nationalism as the product of state apparatus will be, in the following lines, viewed through the categories of formal and symbolic nationalism, both banal and heated. As an introduction to this topic I will try to give several examples in which the exclusively national activities of state apparatus are clearly visible.

In the context of the claim that today's society consists of two spheres – global flow of things and nationally determined community of people – we can say that in the case of the state apparatus we have a constant interplay between opening and closing .i.e. the politics which on the global level tries to encourage the opening of markets, free trade, exchange of goods and circulation of capital, but which also in this global movement tries to obtain for itself the greatest possible gain, in the form of the increased profits, equal and all-inclusive development of its community, incessant growth of power and safety.

Hence, next to the politics of opening to the global movements, we also have the politics of closing, of exclusivity. What I mean by that is the selective approach to the distribution of wealth which is trying to maximize wealth by restricting it to nationally determined communities or specific groups inside nationally determined communities (elites). In that aspect, there is a tendency towards building and improving systems which are situated inside national borders. On the economic plan, maybe the best example of this double policy are undoubtedly state subventions for agriculture which are used by the highly developed countries, and even though on the world market some underdeveloped countries can produce large amounts of cheap food, their agriculture is almost ruined because of the existence of even cheaper food produced by the help of these subventions in the highly developed countries. Through state policy, and in opposition to the laws of the market, in the highly developed countries, the

development of a specific branch of economy was encouraged, not, as it were, because of finding the most rational and most effective economic solution, but only because of the politics of preserving jobs for local population. In contrast to the classic liberal standing which, in ideal case, would select the solution which would bring to the collapse of the globally uncompetitive branches of economy, a solution was selected in which the state, through subventions, tried to preserve competitiveness, and hence jobs for millions of workers in agriculture all over the developed world.

Similar example we can find in the politics of immigration and obtaining citizenship. No state will allow the uncontrolled immigration of immigrants and labor force whose arrival will cause the redistribution of wealth, decline in standard and social protests. These examples best illustrate the restrictive and exclusive attitude which a state has with certain issues. It is interesting to point out that exclusivity and closing up do not have to be necessarily accompanied by nationalist exclusivist ideology. This discrepancy between ideology and practice of the state apparatus is characteristic for the Western anti-nationalist ideology. Practice and ideology in a certain state can significantly differ from each other as they often do. Here we are dealing with the classic concept of ideology which stems from Marx who defined such ideology as, the so-called, fake consciousness. It refers to the conscious cover-up and lying. In this case we have the Western politics which emphasizes anti-nationalist ideology and universalism and in practice frequently makes extremely nationalistic and particularistic moves.

Katunarić singled out two authors who wrote on related topics. These were Michael Bilig and Rogers Brubaker.

Formal and symbolic, banal and heated nationalism

Brubaker (Katunarić 2003:280) deals with citizenship, i.e. the principle of citizenship which is inclusive from the inside and exclusive from the outside, and which best illustrates the selective attitude towards individuals and groups on the side of the state apparatus. This conclusion is very important for the broader understanding of nation and nationalism because it includes state and state apparatus. According to Katunarić, part of the reasons for social exclusion was transferred from nationalism to the state. Nationalism helps in the closing of the state, even though it is not the only agent of closing which is found in the logic of citizenship. By this approach we are throwing light on the formal borders which close a certain society and prevent the access to its vital institutions. Formal borders are the products of the activities of the state apparatus and their existence does not have to be expressed symbolically through nationalism and nationalist ideology. By this we have divided the exclusivist activities of nation-states on the formal and symbolic principle. As we have seen, formal principle is very important for the analysis and refers to the state and its apparatus as well as to the global system of power which we have observed through

the analytic category of society. Formal principle was often neglected in the analyses, since its work was quiet and slow and frequently covered up by the anti-nationalist ideology which serves as the basic analytical framework for the criticism of nationalism. Michael Bilig's work, whom I have mentioned before, is very important here. In his analysis Bilig emphasizes the quiet work of the disguised nationalism which uses the universalistic ideology for mimicry. He calls it 'banal nationalism' and says: *'These habits of thought also cross national boundaries. As an ideology, nationalism is not restricted by national borders, its standpoints are spread internationally. George Bush, while announcing the Gulf War, spoke to the world... Nationalism in the modern world represents universal goals. Speech on the new world order suggests that national and international are intertwined. However, one nation tries hard to represent that order. In present circumstances, the special attention has to be paid to the United States of America and its nationalism. Above all, this nationalism seemed so forgotten, so natural to the social scientists, and today it is globally important'* (Katunarić 2003:267, 268).

Very interesting claim which we can witness in everyday life, for example in the entertainment industry which is globally distributed, where in the movies of American production we can frequently see how, for example, in the battle between aliens and humans, the 'Americans' with their planes, flags and heroes speak in the name of the whole world without any problem....

In the more serious sphere of the international relations such tendencies are visible when, for example, a war is being justified. Even though narrow(minded) nationalistic interests of specific country or countries are in the background of the conflict, the justification of the conflict (in the case of the countries of the Western world) comes down to the moral categories where we have confronted good-evil, democracy-authoritarianism, freedom-tyranny, civilization-barbarianism...

Even though all these things are obvious, we should not simply restrict all analytic categories on the concept of nation and nationalism, because other nations as well, and not only the 'Americans' benefit from the global system of power, and hence our observation should always return to the categories of society and global system of power. Moreover, we should bear in mind that not all the members of American nation or all the citizens of a country benefit from the global system of power. If we see nation-state as a reservoir of power then we will definitely reach a conclusion that the state, above all, benefits the most powerful structures inside itself, the elites and their capital. Hence, neither the nation should be seen as a unique entity in which class and social conflicts do not exist, in which there are neither the deprived or rejected, not the rich and the privileged. These thoughts are bringing us back to the claims, outlined at the beginning, that the building and self-understanding of national identity is not related only to the symbolic structures such as the flag, name, language which have a transparent exclusive content, the identity can refer to the entire way of life, i.e. the self-perception of wealth, spending, consumerism, amounting of wealth and goods, maximization of one's own pleasure and hedonism, these are also some of the factors of identity which do not have an exclusive national mark, but which can best be achieved inside the national borders of the developed countries.

If seen in this way, it certainly adopts implicit national connotations and becomes an unavoidable factor in the political calculations of national politicians, and thus gets a certain *national importance*, i.e. becomes a factor of national political calculations. Until now, we used Bilig's taxonomy of banal nationalism. Next to banal nationalism, Bilig also lists the so-called heated nationalism, characteristic for the 'barbaric countries', it is cruel, wild and a bit exotic (Katunarić 2003:269). Heated nationalism loudly proclaims social exclusion, intolerance, conflict, directly attacks its opponents, minorities and the unadjusted. Hence, with banal nationalism we have quiet, formalistic principle of the state apparatus which effectively imposes particularistic politics without relying on the ideological symbolic apparatus which would support exclusion.

After these remarks, I will here introduce the division according to which I will link banal nationalism with formalistic principle and heated nationalism with symbolic principle. This division, of course, is not absolute, i.e. it is not logically exclusive because in the countries where banal nationalism is dominant, there are also tendencies which are in favor of explicit social exclusion, while in the countries of the heated nationalism there are tendencies and movements which support universalistic rhetoric. The situation is rather fluid and changeable and highly dependant on the political and economic problems specific societies and states are faced with. In this context it is interesting to see what happened with the anti-nationalistic rhetoric in today's world on the example of the USA and some European countries. The USA has suffered a terrorist attack and danger on its own territory, and turned from the pioneer of anti-nationalism and promoter of human right into the carrier of the heated nationalism which turned the postmodern multiple identities, tolerance and public freedom into one-sided cultural exclusion, intolerance to difference, firm division on good and evil and, what is the worst, in silenced violation of human rights with majority support. With European countries such tendencies are best observed with the growing Euro-skepticism of the leading EU countries, where the people and sometimes even politics, stand firmly in the defense of their national interests – benefits, wealth, cultural identity.

We can observe a tendency that when it comes a certain 'formal' system become stretched to the utmost, there is recourse to a symbolic system through which a certain defense is mobilized. To what extent will such tendencies in the Western countries continue to grow and intensity depends primarily on the borders of their systems, their capabilities and possibilities to deal with global changes. When we are talking about borders of the system we primarily mean the economic, political, technological, military and even ideological reserves of power these systems posses.

This analysis has forced us to observe state as a heterogeneous phenomenon which continually re-assembles its organism, renovates it and strengthens, and in these processes the key role has nation and nationalism as a form of collective identity which provides the state with the necessary symbolic support. If we take this analysis to be relevant, that we can maybe answer the question why the fear for Croatian national identity has lately been frequently expressed. This is even stranger due to the fact that Croatia is an independent and internationally recognized country

with its economy, army, politics and culture. It is obvious that in the global world the reservoir of power which we call Croatian state faces a number of difficulties in the contemporary liberal world. Here I primarily refer to the non-competitiveness of the economic system and its impossibility to deal with the global economic movements. This impossibility affects the standard and self-perception of the citizens, as the members of the state, who then perceive themselves as losers as compared to the others, which in a significant number of citizens results in a revolt which is channeled through compensation on the symbolic plan, as the concern about one's own identity. These processes are enhanced by the political activities of the domestic nationalist elites which channel and misuse civil dissatisfaction and transfer the responsibility to the global system of power i.e. primarily to the West which is, according to this interpretation, perceived as a liberal-capitalist exploitation 'hydra' and a co-culprit for today's impossible situation. To such perception of the outer world a set of political pressures is added and the West is trying to impose them, through anti-nationalist ideology, on the countries of the Western Balkan which are perceived as the political anachronisms, not yet included into the modern world.

Such attitudes hurt national pride and create resistance towards the outer world. Even though the nationalist ideologues have wrongly interpreted it, the attitude on the partial guilt of the global system for today's difficult situation in the transitional countries is partially correct, however, the defense politics which emphasized it by encouraging closing-up of certain countries proved to be of little use, since these were mostly unconstructive, fanatic ideologies which could offer nothing but conflicts. What is important to notice here is that the state reservoir of power, which tries to preserve wealth, legal rights and physical force inside its borders, in the times of crisis resorts to culture and symbolic movement through which it tries to re-affirm and strengthen its borders which were once established by the state apparatus of military and police. The result is nationalism, ideology which promotes intolerance and exclusion on the basis of different cultural marking, ideology which encourages the creation of difference and separation and builds on them its political future.

By this analysis I tried to point to the relationship between the symbolic movement and state order, i.e. between nationalism and state. From the above lines, we could extract a definition of nation and nationalism which was until now, implicitly employed in our discussions.

Nation and nationalism

Nation is the way of shaping collective identity of one segment of a society as a system of power and inequality (Katunarić 2003:79). Nation would therefore be a fact of a collective identity, hence, a static analytic concept. But, as I have emphasized before, nation is not a metaphysical fact, but something that is continually changed, produced or reproduced. What makes nation move, its active agent, its internal initiator, is nationalism. Nationalism can be, inside a supranational system, defined as

a political movement which separates a specific territorial or collective unit, on the basis of different cultural traits or just different interpretation of its past, from supranational system (Katunarić 2003:89). The aim of this separation can be a partial or complete sovereignty inside one's own state or establishment of a higher level of independence inside an existing state. Here nationalism employs ideological propaganda and building up of economic and political institutions which are characteristic for a supranational system.

As we can see, nationalism always needs a supranational system as a background, which has a universal character and the infrastructure of which nationalism transforms into local, particularistic form. That means that nationalism is not a system ideology in itself, but that it frequently provides the crucial symbolic support by awaking strong and mass beliefs that nation is something that should not be question under any circumstances. Nationalistic rhetoric creates believes that nation is the final aim, something which exists for itself, and that earthly existence has the final meaning in the building up and preservation of something we call nation. According to this, nation would be a form of collective identity which endows its members with the final meaning of their actions inside a supranational system.

Collective identity and building of identity

These conclusions open up a few theoretical perspectives on the questions of collective identity:

1. Identity is a dynamic phenomenon. Even though established and strengthened, even inside a modern state, it has to be continually renewed and re-produced. Identity, therefore, is not an independent metaphysical entity which travels unchanged through the vastness of history. It is a product of historical practice which is formed and re-formed and which is conditioned by the power relations and by other identities.
2. A necessary condition for the establishment of identity is the relationship with the Other and the formation of inter-group borders. The content of identity changes as a function of the relationship with the others, with other nations, global system of power and inequality.
3. In the analysis of identity, we have to link it to the *power relations* which determine it, i.e. collective identity is always determined by the power relations. We will name these power relations as the *central category* for the building of identity. By using Castells's division on the types of identity, we can conclude that the power relations will determined whether a collective identity will 'end up' as *legitimizing* identity, *project* identity or *identity* of resistance. Power relations will determine whether a group, ethnos or nation will come up with the strength to build legitimizing institutions, i.e. to build its own state or to re-structure a social structure

and obtain a privileged position inside a state or supranational system of power, or to enter the trenches of resistance. If we accept the above claim, then with the analysis of nation and nationalism we have to take into account a state and states which are the carriers of the global system of power. Here I am talking about a modern state as a specific modern form of government which in a unique historical way, channels and reproduces power. This does not mean that in the past there were no collective identities which were formed through some other structures and power relations. This brings us to the conclusion that modern identities are also, up to a certain level, heirs to specific historical identity structures. They are today mostly discussed through the concepts of *ethnos* and *ethnicity*.

4. Identity is, besides the already mentioned functional reasons, determined by cultural-historical heritage of a specific territory, locality, region. Historically inherited cultural diversification provides the crucial symbolic material which serves for the formation of a specific collective identity of a group. Therefore, with the analysis of identity we have to take into account the cultural content ensure symbolic reserve for its formation. The sphere of culture contains language, social norms and customs, opinions and knowledge, religion, mythology, common memories and history. Each of these elements can serve as a building material in the formation of identity. I think that the knowledge of history and reservoir of memories, especially in modernity, is an important factor in the building of identity. The question of historical continuity which is transferred by the help of memories presents a bone of contention for many theoreticians of identity, particularly national. Here I have presented a thesis that in the building of identity the historically inherited differentiation of identity, which is transferred to the cultural sphere, was equally important. In my opinion, this thesis is not controversial. The interpretations of identity differentiation are controversial, or in other words, the interpretation of history which appears in a given moment is controversial. In these interpretations what is specifically emphasized is the belief and consciousness of historical continuity, common origin and special status of a certain nation. These elements, according to Smith, form ethnic and national myths. According to Smith, ethnic myths, mythical-symbolic complexes existed even in the pre-modern times (A. D. Smith 1986). However, that does not mean that we can trace continuity from some pre-modern ethnic group to today's nation. According to my opinion, it is important to emphasize that there is no *material* continuity but only *symbolic* continuity which is mythically manufactured in the belief on the material continuity of a given community. As Anderson showed us (Anderson 1990:33), for the outline of the material continuity of a community, what was necessary was the new, *homogenous*, empty understanding of time characteristic for modernity.⁴ As a proof of material continuity we have cultural remnants which are interpreted⁵ as very old, ancient

⁴ "The idea of social organism which moves calendar-like through homogenous, empty time is analogue to the idea of nation which is also perceived as a stable community which continually and equally moves down (or up) through history. One American will never see, let alone meet more than a handful of his

and *original* (whatever that means). From the belief in continuity and common faith stems the power of symbols which, on the basis of the existing system, creates unity and social solidarity.

5. This points to the conclusion that identity is not only determined by power relations, but that identity itself determined power relations, i.e. it is itself, through symbols, a power holder. The conditioning of identity and power is reversible.
6. Even though identity is a collective category, not all members of a community or a group of different communities are the creators, conceptual and political initiators of a collective identity. Namely, some members of a community participate passively, and some actively in the creation and continuation of a collective identity. Groups which actively participate are usually called the elites which, by definition, possess material, political and intellectual power to become the agent which create or support a collective identity (Gellner 1998). With this analysis a very useful concept is the concept of ideology introduced by Marx. The concept of ideology in this context reveals that under official ideology there are always different material and political interests of the ruling groups which are covered up, and which are actually damaging to the majority of the members of a community.
7. Even though elites and their interests are conceptual and political initiators of collective identities, their active work would not be successful without the passive support of the majority of the members of a community.⁶ (As we have seen identity can be built through resistance to the elites. The above mentioned identity of resistance falls into that category of identities. Regardless of the fact whether they are providing resistance or support, the fact remains that certain forms of collective identity are extremely popular.) Why certain forms of collective identity are extremely popular with the majority of the members of a community, is a very interesting question which I have answered in my previous discussions. The great popularity of specific collective identities, especially national identities, stems from

240 000000 American co-patriots. He/she has no idea what they are doing in a given moment. But he/she believes in their incessant, anonymous, *simultaneous* activity.

⁵ The remnants are not only collected and interpreted, they are re-created and revived. Thus we get the *invented* tradition (Hobsbawm 1993). It consists of: 'a set of practices, usually managed on the basis of openly or tacitly accepted rules...which... automatically include continuity with historical past. A striking example was the deliberate choice of gothic style in the re-building of British Parliament and the decision to restore the Parliamentary cabinet in exactly the same style as it was built. In short, these are the answers to the new situations which refer to the old situations or which establish their own past through the almost obligatory repetition.' (from Katunarić 2004:232).

⁶ It is important to notice that we are talking about the *majority* of the members of a community. That means that we cannot speak about all the members of a community. The culture of a community is not a homogeneous entity, if we take into account power relations, it can simultaneously contain different types of identity, from legitimizing identity to identity of resistance. Members of a community can possess qualitatively different identities (gender, professional, class, regional, ethnic, religious). The thesis I outline here is that certain identities due to external, historical, reasons and internal, functional, reasons (which I will outline later), provide a powerful source of meaning for its members. In this type of identity we can include national identity.

their ability to provide meaning to human actions and existence. This topic will be further discussed.

In the previous lines we have seen that nation is a form of collective identity which provides its members with the meaning of their actions. From this standpoint, it is interesting to see how Castells defines identity:

Under the concept of identity, if we are speaking of social agents, I include the process of creation of the meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute or a number of cultural attributes which were given advantage in relation to the other sources of meaning. (Why they were given advantage?)

Identity should be differentiated from what sociologists traditionally called 'roles'. Roles are defined through norms which have been structured by social institutions and organizations. Identities are more powerful sources of meaning than roles, because of the processes of self-building and individuation they include. (A questionable thesis.) Identities organize meanings, while roles organize functions. I define the purpose of a social agent as the symbolic identification of the purpose of its actions (Castells 2002:17).

Now it is obvious, as I have emphasized earlier, that the thesis that identities are more powerful sources of meaning, should be explained in more details.

Before I have enumerated reasons for the success of the liberal nation-state, and hence nation as collective identity. If we follow this line of thought, we can conclude that for some reason in the symbolic sphere, i.e. the sphere of providing meaning, nation is a great success. I think that primary reason is not the process of individuation which is mentioned here. I think that Benedict Anderson (Anderson 1990:20) came closest to the right answer when he said that nation provided answers from religious aspect which dealt with death, suffering, coincidence and ephemerality.

What exactly are we talking about here?

When we say 'meaning', the majority of people have a vague understanding of this concept. In everyday speech, the concept of 'meaning' can have different connotations and refer to different things. The greatest reverence is given to the question of the so-called meaning of life which, with majority of people, is not explicated into a concrete question but always exists somewhere in the background as an emotion which is continually present in all our activities. What we 'commonly' called here the meaning of life actually in the majority of the cases refers to the question of the meaning of time, i.e. when we observe it from the standpoint of a single individual it can be transformed into the question on the meaning of the movement of human beings 'one after the other', which appears as birth, development, death, re-birth, development, death, etc.

Hence, when I say 'meaning' I refer to the understanding which stems from the questions which in the past, were dominantly answered by religion; the final questions dealing with death, coincidence, finality, decline, continuity, etc. Anderson's thesis, hence, in an interesting way answers the question why nation-state is extreme-